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Väyrynen’s book is the first book-length study focused on the issue of thick concepts. 
While many ethicists and metaethicists have taken an interest in this topic, to the 
extent that it arguably qualifies as a ‘hot’ topic, Väyrynen’s systematic treatment of 
the issues is very welcome. Apart from what it achieves concerning thick concepts, 
Väyrynen’s book is also an instance of a more general phenomenon: theorists 
incorporating insights from linguistics and philosophy of language into metaethics. 
Not only is it an instance of the phenomenon: it is an example of this methodology at 
its very best. 
 The notion of a thick concept is best introduced by examples. Among thick 
concepts are discreet, cautious, industrious, assiduous, frugal, prudent, treacherous, 
just, decent, generous, loyal, grateful, courageous, sleazy, uptight, cruel, brutal, 
deceitful (all Väyrynen’s examples, from p. 1) – as well as, of course, lewd, rude, and 
nasty. Giving a proper theoretical characterization of the notion of a thick concept, is 
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difficult.1 But some characterizations take as their point of departure that thick 
concepts somehow merge descriptive and evaluative aspects (where thin concepts by 
contrast are more purely evaluative). Other characterizations are based on the idea 
that thick concepts are more specific than thin ones.  
 Thick concepts have been put to use in various ways in the philosophical 
literature, perhaps most famously in arguments against non-cognitivism and more 
generally in arguments against there being a fact-value dichotomy – these are 
arguments to the effect that the descriptive and evaluative aspects of a thick concepts 
cannot be disentangled. I will return to such considerations. More generally, many 
theorists think (meta)ethics should focus more on the thick and less on the thin.2 
Väyrynen’s own characterization of the notions of a thick term and a thick concept 
is as follows: 
 
A term T stands for a thick concept if (i) x is T entails, as a conceptual matter, that 
x falls under some distinct concept or concepts N1, . . ., Nn (not specified) of a 
certain (specified) general type A (where A and N1, . . ., Nn may be purely non-
evaluative descriptions or involve […] evaluations) and (ii) literal uses of x is T in 
normal contexts somehow convey global evaluations to the effect that x is good, or 
bad, in a certain way. (p. 42) 
 
Strictly, this only says what it is for a term (specifically, a predicate) to stand for a 
thick concept. Presumably, a “thick term” is a term that stands for a thick concept. 
The notion of a thick concept is not characterized directly. One reason it may be good 
to stress this is that one can think that there may be concepts that intuitively are to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Eklund (2011), as well as Väyrynen, section 1.2. 
2 Väyrynen lists many friends of this view, including e.g. Anscombe (1958), Foot (1958), Platts (1979), 
Williams (1985), Hurley (1989), Hursthouse (1996), Kirchin (2010) and Roberts (2011). 
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regarded as thick even while no term as a matter of semantics stands for these 
concepts.  
Väyrynen’s Pragmatic View on thick concepts is the view that “Global T-
evaluations are implications of T-utterances which are normally not at issue in their 
literal uses in normal contexts, and which arise conversationally” (p. 122). The chief 
opposing view is the Semantic View, according to which “The semantic (truth-
conditional) meanings of thick terms and concepts contain global T-evaluations” (p. 
59). Less technically put, the Pragmatic View is the view that the evaluations 
intuitively associated with thick concepts – when we apply a positive (negative) thick 
concept to something we are saying something positive (negative) about it – are only 
pragmatically associated with the concepts, and the semantic view is that these 
evaluations are semantically associated with the concepts. (The talk of “global” 
versus “embedded” evaluations is comes from Elstein and Hurka (2009). Very briefly, 
if a predicate F is globally evaluative then to say “x is F” is to evaluate x in a 
particular way. A predicate can in principle embed evaluation in some other way.) 
Given the way Väyrynen himself uses the label “thick”, a term or concept is 
thick even if it is not evaluative as a matter of meaning or content. On a different way 
of using “thick”, a term or concept is thick only if its content is in and of itself 
evaluative. Someone who uses “thick” this latter way would say that on Väyrynen’s 
view, many supposedly thick terms and concepts are in fact not thick.3 In what 
follows I will speak Väyrynen’s way. 
 When one characterizes what it is to be thick one ideally wants to contrast the 
thick both with the thin and with the wholly non-evaluative. It is clause (ii) that is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For example, Roberts (2011) characterizes Blackburn’s (1992) view as follows: “Blackburn holds that 
there are no thick concepts, only loaded terms, that is, that the evaluative aspect of a so-called thick 
term is no part of the content of the concept expressed by that term” (p. 495fn14). She then uses 
“thick” in this latter way. If one uses “thick” Väyrynen’s way, one should say that Blackburn does not 
deny that there are thick concepts but understands their evaluativeness pragmatically. 
	   4	  
supposed to provide the contrast with the wholly non-evaluative and clause (i) that is 
supposed to provide the contrast with the thin. I am doubtful that clause (i) wholly 
successfully accomplishes this. There are arguably some descriptive constraints 
associated even with the thinnest of our terms. Väyrynen actually agrees, and takes 
the distinction between the thin and the thick to rather be a matter of degree. Even the 
thinnest terms are thick given the above characterization. 
Väyrynen relies on two kinds of arguments. First, there are defeasibility 
arguments. Väyrynen emphasizes, e.g., that it seems in order to say “whether or not 
Madonna’s show is lewd, it’s not bad in any way distinctive of explicit sexual 
display” (p. 70). The thought is that if the evaluation were semantically associated 
with “lewd” it would not be in order to say this, any more than it would be in order to 
say “so-and-so is a bachelor, but so-and-so isn’t a man”.4 
Second, there are projection arguments. Some people find some thick 
concepts objectionable. For example, some might find “lewd” objectionable, thinking 
its use in some way presupposes the prudes’ way of thinking about sexuality (roughly, 
that its use presupposes that there is something bad about displays of sexuality). 
Following Väyrynen, call those with this view lewd-objectors. Lewd-objectors of 
course refuse to call things lewd. They do not say, for instance, “Madonna’s show is 
lewd”. What is more interesting, they would also (Väyrynen says) avoid using “lewd” 
in embedded contexts. Consider 
 
1a. Nuh uh, Madonna’s show isn’t lewd; it’s sexually insinuating alright, but no 
private parts are exposed. 
b. Is Madonna’s show lewd? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Well, it could be in order to say something of the latter form in certain contexts. On could use such a 
sentence to describe a female who behaves like a stereotypical bachelor. But then “bachelor” arguably 
isn’t used literally. 
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c. Madonna’s show might be lewd. 
d. If Madonna’s show is lewd, the tabloid press will go nuts. (p. 74) 
 
The claim is that lewd-objectors would refrain from using 1a-1d. But this is 
something the Semantic View cannot explain. If the evaluation were just part of the 
semantic content of “lewd”, then the lewd-objector should have no problem at all with 
“Madonna’s show isn’t lewd”. Some other account of the evaluation associated with 
“lewd” is needed. (I present Väyrynen’s argument in a somewhat simplified way, as if 
it purported to be a demonstrative argument. Väyrynen himself rather presents his 
argument as an inference to best explanation.)5 
 
1. What Väyrynen does not rule out 
The Semantic View is the majority view. Already since this is so, convincing 
arguments for the Pragmatic View are significant. But I still want to emphasize the 
limitations of what Väyrynen is arguing: what views in the vicinity Väyrynen’s 
arguments for the Pragmatic View and against the Semantic View do not refute, even 
if successful as far as they go. 
Note first that the notion of a thick concept nowhere appears in the 
characterization of the Pragmatic View. The Pragmatic View is only a view on the 
linguistics of thick terms. It is not about concepts at all.  Given that one should 
distinguish between terms and concepts, and that there can be concepts, including 
concepts we employ, that are not semantically expressed by any term we use at all, 
this is rather striking. 
The Semantic View as stated does happen to mention concepts, but this seems 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In my summary of Väyrynen’s main arguments I have stuck closely to Bedke’s (2014) way of 
characterizing them. 
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incidental. Väyrynen’s actual argumentative strategy is that of looking at 
paradigmatic thin terms. By looking at (what purports to be) various acceptable literal 
uses of them, Väyrynen concludes that the evaluativeness is a matter of pragmatics 
and not semantics. This is exactly what his Pragmatic View states. The Semantic 
View in part says that the semantic meanings of thick terms contain global T-
evaluations; and Väyrynen’s arguments clearly target that aspect of the Semantic 
View. The only way Väyrynen’s arguments can plausibly be thought immediately to 
show that the contents of thick concepts do not contain global T-evaluations is if it is 
assumed that thick concepts (if any) are the meanings of thick terms. But this seems 
like something that cannot just be blithely assumed. Nor does Väyrynen take himself 
to assume this. He has an explicit discussion of the relation between thick terms and 
thick concepts, noting that the relationship needn’t be straightforward (see the 
discussion in section 3.1.2, pp. 69ff). But it still seems to me that his actual 
argumentative strategy presupposes that the relationship is straightforward: that thick 
concepts, if any, are semantically expressed by actual thick terms. 
Väyrynen does, I should immediately note, separately discuss the view that 
thick terms are context-sensitive and semantically express different concepts in 
different contexts, and that in some contexts they semantically express something 
evaluative. He gives arguments for why this view is to be dismissed (pp. 73ff). But 
there are other possibilities as well. It can be that some concepts with the 
characteristics many other theorists would want to ascribe to thick concepts do exist 
and contents involving them tend to be pragmatically conveyed using thick terms. 
This view may or may not in the end be attractive. And it might be that some of what 
Väyrynen says can be used against the view. But Väyrynen never addresses it head 
on. So Väyrynen leaves open that there are thick concepts whose (global) 
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evaluativeness is a matter of their content. (Although it deserves stressing that those 
who emphasize thick concepts in ethics and metaethics tend to think these concepts 
are somehow central to our ethical thinking. One may then ask: if they are so central, 
why would we not have words that semantically express them?) 
In general, it is worth pointing to a number of different views that are left 
unscathed by Väyrynen’s discussion. I now mention some further such views. One 
purpose to which thick concepts have been put is that of supporting the idea that there 
are cases where one cannot properly grasp a concept without having the proper 
evaluative outlook. This idea might seem to be immediately ruled out given the 
Pragmatic View, on the ground that if a global T-evaluation is not contained in the 
content of the concept, then surely employment of the concept cannot require a 
particular evaluative outlook. But something at least very much in the spirit of the 
view sketched is perfectly consistent with Väyrynen’s Pragmatic View.  For consider 
the following possibility. Some properties are such that the only way one can refer to 
them non-derivatively requires having a particular evaluative outlook: it is only such 
an outlook that provides the requisite cognitive or epistemic access for that. Others 
too can refer to these properties, but only derivatively, by belonging to the same 
linguistic community as those with the evaluative outlook in question. This is all 
consistent with Väyrynen’s view, for the view is only about the meanings of terms. 
Maybe our term “lewd” is such that Väyrynen’s Pragmatic View is true of it, while 
the property it ascribes, the property of lewdness, is a property that one can only 
derivatively refer to if one does not share a particular evaluative outlook. Even those 
who do not share the outlook can use the term “lewd” with linguistic propriety, even 
while the fact that we have a term that ascribes the property lewdness requires that 
some of us do have (or, weaker, that some members of our community have had) the 
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evaluative outlook in question. Compare names. If I overhear someone use the name 
“Bob” I can go on to use the name to semantically refer to whatever it semantically 
referred to in the speaker’s mouth. Using a word with its customary reference is easy. 
This is so even if “Bob”’s reference is something quite special, such that it is only 
because some of us have special cognitive capacities that we have such a name as 
“Bob” in our language at all. 
Anyone who distinguishes between concepts and properties (the concept water 
and the concept H2O are distinct concepts but they ascribe the same property) must 
acknowledge that there is a at least a conceptual distinction between thick concepts 
and thick properties. This parallels how one can and should distinguish between 
evaluative concepts on the one hand have and evaluative properties on the other. 
Some views can allow that some evaluative concepts fail to ascribe evaluative 
properties; some views can allow that some evaluative properties are ascribed by 
concepts that are not evaluative. More radically, some theorists could hold that only 
properties are genuinely evaluative and that there are no evaluative concepts at all.6 
And some theorists could hold that only concepts are genuinely evaluative and there 
are no evaluative properties at all. As my topic here is the thick specifically, I will not 
pause to evaluate the plausibility of either kind of view. Turning to the thick, one 
possibility is that there are semantically thick concepts but no thick properties. (One 
kind of argument for that sort of view would be that thickness is a matter of 
description and evaluation combined; and describing is something that terms and 
concepts do but properties do not. Such an argument may, however, trade on an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Recall the earlier discussion of different ways of using the locution “thick concept”. On Väyrynen’s 
way of using this locution, a concept can be thick even if its content is not inherently evaluative. If one 
uses “evaluative concept” the same way, a concept need not be inherently evaluative in order to count 
as evaluative; it is sufficient that it tends to be used evaluatively. Given that use of “evaluative 
concept” it would be very odd to insist that there are no evaluative concepts. The way to state the 
possibility mentioned in the text would be: there are no concepts that are evaluative as a matter of 
content (as opposed to merely being used evaluatively).  
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understanding of “description” that in the context is too strict.) Another possibility, 
more relevant to what Väyrynen seeks to establish, is that while no concepts contain 
evaluation as part of their content, there are thick properties such that evaluativeness 
is part of their nature. While the thick concepts we use do not as a matter of semantics 
convey global evaluations, there are thick properties: evaluative properties that in 
some sense merge features characteristically associated with non-evaluative 
properties and features characteristically associated with evaluative properties. Those 
who believe in thick concepts somehow merging the descriptive and the evaluative do 
sometimes speak as if they also believe in thick properties that behave analogously.7 
Väyrynen’s argument against the Semantic View on thick concepts does not 
immediately speak against the existence of thick properties. It does not even 
immediately speak against these thick properties being ascribed by thick concepts 
understood as Väyrynen understands them. 
I have just mentioned some views on the thick that Väyrynen’s arguments do 
not rule out. Even if the views are not strictly ruled out, Väyrynen could maintain that 
whatever appeal they have depends on the mistaken view on thick concepts (the 
Semantic View) that Väyrynen is out to refute.  Maybe this is so. I am not concerned 
to argue that it is not so. But argument for the claim that it is so would be needed. The 
views on the thick I have just called attention to are not even mentioned in 
Väyrynen’s book.  
 
2. Thick concepts and the fact-value distinction 
In the last chapter of the book, “Thick Concepts: Deflating Significance”, Väyrynen 
discusses the upshot of what he has argued for the debate over thick concepts. He 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See e.g. Dancy (1993), McNaughton and Rawling (2000) Zangwill (2013), and Alfano & Loeb 
(2014). 
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discusses the consequences of what he has argued for claims often advanced in 
discussions focusing on thick concepts. One thesis he discusses is 
 
(FV1) The factual and the evaluative are mutually exclusive (p. 234), 
 
Väyrynen comments that the best case for using thick concepts to challenge (FV1) 
would be if the following theses, 
 
Inseparability Thick terms and concepts are or represent irreducible fusions of 
evaluation and non-evaluative description; these aspects cannot be “disentangled” 
from one another. (p. 12)8 
 
Irreducible Thickness Thick terms and concepts are evaluative “in their own right”, 
independently of their relationship to any other evaluations characterizable in 
independently intelligible terms. (p. 209)9 
 
were true, but that given his arguments, including his arguments for the Pragmatic 
View and against the Semantic View, this case cannot be made.10 The idea is that 
these two theses presuppose the Semantic View. Maybe Väyrynen is right about the 
“best case”. But discussion of (FV1) and close cousins is often marred by the fact that 
two theses in the vicinity are not carefully distinguished. One issue, having to do with 
representations – linguistic expressions and concepts – concerns whether the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Väyrynen (p. 12fn20) lists Wiggins (1976), Platts (1979), Williams (1985), Putnam (2002) and 
Kirchin (2010) as friends of Inseparability. 
9 Väyrynen (pp. 210-11, fn51, 54) mentions Dancy (1995), Harcourt & Thomas (2013), Kirchin (2013) 
and Roberts (2013) as friends of Irreducible Thickness. 
10 He mentions Dancy (1995), Harcourt & Thomas (2013), Kirchin (2013) and Roberts (2013) as 
friends of Irreducible Thickness.  
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categories of factual and evaluative representations are exclusive. Another issue, 
having to do with metaphysics, concerns whether there is an exclusive distinction 
between the kinds of properties and facts that evaluative predicates and sentences tend 
to stand for and the properties and facts that non-evaluative predicates and sentences 
tend to stand for.11 The relevance of the distinction to Väyrynen’s discussion is that 
Väyrynen without explicit comment immediately focuses on the issue having to do 
with representation. Theses like Inseparability and Irreducible Thickness, and the 
Pragmatic and Semantic Views, are in the first instance only related to the issue 
concerning representation. For all that Väyrynen argues, one could still argue against 
the separate thesis concerning properties and facts by appeal to the nature of thick 
properties.12 
Another thesis Väyrynen considers is 
 
(FV2) Nonevaluative facts are somehow qualitatively different from values; even 
if there are evaluative facts, these are at least in some significant respects 
discontinuous with other sorts of facts. (p. 234) 
 
About this Väyrynen says, “The best case for using thick terms and concepts to 
challenge (FV2) would…be if Inseparability or Irreducible Thickness were true. Each 
would seem to undermine, in its own way, the existence of the sort of qualitative 
difference that (FV2) requires” (p. 234f). Given the Pragmatic View, Inseparability 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Maybe one reason the distinction is not always heeded is that the issue comes up in connection with 
non-cognitivism – and the non-cognitivist characteristically  denies that evaluative predicates stand for 
properties. 
12 Compare too p. 15, where Väyrynen says “One fact-value distinction is the idea that the factual and 
the evaluative are mutually exclusive (Putnam […]). This would have significant implications 
regarding the semantics, metaphysics and epistemology of value.” I would rather say that there are 
different “fact-value distinctions”; a distinction with significant implications for the semantics of value 
doesn’t immediately have such implications for the metaphysics of value, etc. 
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and Irreducible Thickness are unsupported. Väyrynen concludes that “if the Pragmatic 
View is correct, then thick terms and concepts raise no challenge to (FV2)” (ibid.). I 
guess it is obvious from the preceding discussion what I have to say about this. Points 
about thick terms and concepts are in the first instance points about how things stand 
on the representation side, with terms and concepts. But (FV2) is a thesis about 
properties and facts. So what Väyrynen primarily focuses on is not even directly 
relevant to (FV2).  
Väyrynen could certainly insist in response that it is the critics of (FV2) who 
hold that points about thick concepts problematize (FV2), so the distinction I stress 
are primarily problems not for him but for the critics of (FV2). Maybe he would be 
right about that. 
 
3. What is evaluation? 
What are “evaluations” in Väyrynen’s discussion, for example in his statement if the 
Semantic View? Generally, what does it take for a concept to be evaluative (in and of 
itself, as a matter of content), and what does it take for a property to be evaluative? 
(Note that these are different questions, and that the answers to these questions may 
well differ in important ways.) Väyrynen has a discussion of this, but let me first 
discuss the matter in abstraction from his explicit remarks. I believe that the matter is 
a crucial one, and that there are problems here that Väyrynen does not properly attend 
to.  
Much of Väyrynen’s argument against the Semantic View and for the 
Pragmatic View is in terms of what is entailed regarding goodness (/badness) in a 
way. This suggests a sufficient condition for evaluativeness for concepts: a concept C 
is evaluative if a is C conceptually entails a is good (/bad) in a way. I take it that 
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transposing this to the evaluativeness of expressions is straightforward, at least when 
it comes to predicates. (Transposing it to the case of properties is less straightforward. 
Consider the suggestion that property P is evaluative if a’s being P necessitates that a 
is good (/bad) in a way. The trouble with that is that given that evaluative properties 
supervene on descriptive ones, this will misclassify descriptive properties as 
evaluative. The source of the problem is in the “necessitates”. But we cannot talk of 
conceptual entailment anymore when we consider properties. Given that there can be 
different concepts of the same property, it does not make good sense to speak of 
properties as standing in conceptual entailment relations. a is H2O conceptually 
entails a contains hydrogen; a is water does not. The concepts H2O and water ascribe 
the same property. What should we then say is conceptually entailed by something’s 
having that property?) 
 This sufficient condition for a concept to be evaluative is arguably too weak. 
Goodness and badness in a way come cheaply. If something is F, then that is good in 
the following way: it is good for the purpose of having something that is F. 
Admittedly, it is a separate question whether this is a conceptual entailment. But if 
something is F then it is good for the purpose of having something that is F certainly 
has an analytic feel to it. 
A different suggestion about what it takes for a concept to be evaluative is: 
concept C is evaluative iff a is C conceptually entails a is pro tanto good (bad). Since 
pro tanto goodness (badness) clearly conceptually entails goodness (badness) in a way 
– assuming one takes the notion of conceptual entailment to be in good standing in the 
first place – this suggestion is equivalent to what Väyrynen works with if, but only if, 
goodness (badness) in a way conceptually entails pro tanto goodness (badness). 
Reason to doubt this latter assumption comes from consideration of such ‘ways of 
	   14	  
being good’ as good for realizing the aims of Nazism or good for maximizing human 
suffering. Problems in transposing this to the case of properties are the same as it the 
previous case. Given standard assumptions about the supervenience of the evaluative 
upon the descriptive, pro tanto goodness can be necessitated by purely descriptive 
properties. 
If we understand evaluativeness in terms of links to pro tanto goodness 
(badness) and if goodness (badness) in a way does not suffice for pro tanto goodness 
(badness), then we face the difficult question of how then best to linguistically test for 
evaluativeness. A problem is that the notion of pro tanto goodness (badness) is, if not 
a technical notion, then at least a notion that it is hard to isolate in ordinary discourse. 
Both these first suggested necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
evaluativeness of concepts rely essentially on a notion of conceptual entailment, and 
so anyone with doubts about such a notion will be skeptical of these conditions.13 An 
alternative way of construing evaluativeness of concepts is as derivative upon 
evaluativeness of properties: a concept is evaluative if and only if the property it 
ascribes is evaluative. I think this is quite implausible myself, and that both directions 
of this equivalence face counterexamples, but let me not get into this as I have 
discussed the matter elsewhere.14 At any rate, if this is how we understand the 
evaluativeness of concepts then their evaluativeness depends on metaphysics. 
Linguistic arguments like Väyrynen’s would not have much force. Thick concepts can 
lack conceptual connections to any sort of concept of goodness or badness and still be 
evaluative, by virtue of the nature of the properties they in fact ascribe. 
A quite different suggestion for how to think about evaluativeness links that 
issue to that of motivational internalism. A concept C is positively (negatively) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 There are also other reasons to be skeptical of these proposed conditions. See Eklund (2013). 
14 See Eklund (2013). 
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evaluative iff judging a is C is constitutively linked to having a pro-attitude (con-
attitude) toward A. Motivational internalism is of course controversial, and given this 
construal of evaluativeness it cannot be taken as uncontroversial that any of our 
concepts are evaluative. The relation between understanding evaluativeness by appeal 
to motivational internalism and Väyrynen’s arguments is not entirely straightforward. 
Väyrynen is concerned with links between thick concepts and goodness (/badness) in 
a way, but that issue may be orthogonal to issues concerning motivation since 
judgments about goodness/badness in a way need not be linked to motivation even if 
judgments about plain goodness/badness are. 
As the discussion illustrates, the question of how to understand evaluativeness 
matters when one tries to assess Väyrynen’s arguments. Which conception of 
evaluativeness can be taken to underlie these arguments? Let me turn to what 
Väyrynen actually says about how he understands evaluation for the purposes of his 
discussion: 
 
My suggestion for characterizing evaluation without reference to pro tanto value is 
to understand it as information that is somehow positive or negative in flavor. This 
needn't mean the sort of bare “pro” or “con” assessment exemplified by the proto-
emotivist understanding of evaluative judgment as an expression of a “boo” or a 
“hurrah”. Evaluation might rather be understood as information to the effect that 
something has a positive or negative standing – merit or demerit, worth or 
unworthy, relative to a certain kind of standard. If we say further that the relevant 
kind of standard must be of the kind that is capable of grounding claims of merit or 
worth, this would explain why claims of merit and worth are often expressible by 
the sorts of attitudes that we associate with evaluation, such as praise, admiration 
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and criticism. (p. 29) 
 
This all strikes me as reasonable as far as it goes. But I am not sure how helpful it is. 
If Väyrynen spoke of evaluation simply as information that something has positive or 
negative standing relative to some standard, his criterion would be extremely liberal 
in the way that a “good in some way” criterion is extremely liberal. Taking note of 
this, Väyrynen imposes a requirement on the standard. It “must be of the kind that is 
capable of grounding claims of merit or worth”. But he does not really explain what 
this means, or how it is supposed to rule out what it rules out. It is clear that he wants 
to avoid the extremely liberal view, but it is unclear how his actual formulation could 
achieve this – and how what he proposes is an improvement over appeal to pro tanto 
goodness and badness. 
 
4. On Väyrynen’s arguments 
In the foregoing, I have been concerned to point out what nearby theses Väyrynen’s 
arguments don’t succeed in refuting even if Väyrynen successfully argues for the 
Pragmatic View and against the Semantic View, and I have been discussing questions 
about what it is to be evaluative that I don’t think Väyrynen takes seriously enough. 
In this section I will present considerations more directly targeted against Väyrynen’s 
arguments. 
First, I think there is a kind of Semantic View that Väyrynen fails to consider. 
Consider a broadly Fregean descriptivist view, as such views have often been 
discussed post-Kripke: associated with an expression is a set of descriptions, and the 
semantic value of the expression is what satisfies these descriptions. Or better, 
consider a liberal view of this kind where the semantic value does not actually have to 
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satisfy all the associated descriptions but only has to satisfy a weighted most. A name 
“a” associated with descriptions “F”, “G” and “H” can have as semantic value 
something which satisfies “F” and “G” but not “H”. And to be competent with the 
name one need not be able to associate the name with all the associated descriptions 
but only with a weighted most. The descriptions are still, it would be natural to say, 
semantically and not merely pragmatically associated with the name; there is a 
standing, conventional connection between the name and the descriptions. But notice: 
if so, one could say “a is not H” without linguistic impropriety, despite “H” being 
semantically associated with “a”. But this parallels the data Väyrynen uses for the 
defeasibility argument that he marshals against the Semantic View. There is then a 
semantic view which is perfectly compatible with those data. This is a semantic view 
that does not receive any attention in Väyrynen’s discussion. (I happen not to like this 
specific view myself. But I do favor a view according to which a principle can be 
meaning-constitutive for an expression even though the expression does not actually 
satisfy the principle and even though the principle can be competently rejected by 
users of the expression, and I have applied this general type of view in the case of 
thick concepts – see Eklund (2011).15) 
Even if there is a semantic view which is perfectly compatible with 
defeasibility considerations, there remain Väyrynen’s projection considerations. Let 
me then turn to discuss those considerations in their own right. A complication 
regarding those considerations is that it can be, consistently with the projection data 
that Väyrynen points to, that ‘lewd’ is semantically evaluative but is also associated 
with evaluation pragmatically. It can then be that the ‘lewd’-objector’s refusal to use 
1a-1d is explained by whatever evaluation is pragmatically associated with ‘lewd’. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Although I now think the discussion in Eklund (2011) suffers from not being sufficiently attentive to 
what it is for an expression to be evaluative. 
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the abstract this suggestion should sound rather baroque and uneconomical. In order 
to ward off this sort of view, Väyrynen appeals to simplicity in connection with 
making use of the projection data: the idea is that the Pragmatic View is the simplest 
view that deals with the projection data. 
There is important interplay between the projection considerations and what one 
thinks evaluation is in the first place. Consider what I will refer to as a antimoralist, 
who think does not see reason to favor what is good or disfavor what is bad. She the 
notions of goodness or badness belong to the ideology of slave morality. (Or 
whatever.) She thinks the notions of goodness and badness are infected by some 
defective ideology and should be replaced by, say, Nietzsche-inspired counterparts, 
call them supergood and superbad. I call the character an “antimoralist” because that 
is the label sometimes used, but the way I intend the “good” and “bad” here to be 
understood is as thinly or generally as possible, and not to be understood as pertaining 
specifically to morality.  
This antimoralist is in some ways analogous to the lewd-objector; she is, so to 
speak, a good-objector. Compare now 
 
1*. Giving to charity is good. 
1*a. Giving to charity is not good. 
1*b. Is giving to charity good? 
1*c. Giving to charity might be good. 
1*d. If giving to charity is good, the Mother Teresa gave to charity. 
 
Of course, the antimoralist wouldn’t use 1*. What is more interesting is that the 
antimoralist would be as unwilling to use 1*a-1*d as the lewd-objector is to use 1a-
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1d, and her reasons for the unwillingness would be analogous. How significant is this 
for what Väyrynen is trying to argue? 
 Exactly how significant it is depends again one’s exact views on evaluation. 
For example, if one thinks that goodness/badness talk is trivially semantically 
evaluative and any other evaluative talk is so by virtue of relations to 
goodness/badness talk then one will not be much impressed by this challenge. But let 
me stress the nature of the supposed problem. The thought is that we have a good-
objector (by analogy with the lewd-objector), who because of her qualms about 
“good” refuses to say things like 1*. She is also unwilling to employ 1*a-1*d. It 
appears one could run an argument exactly parallel to the one Väyrynen uses in the 
case of “lewd”. If the evaluation in question resided entirely in the semantics, this 
could not be explained. The arguments are parallel. If Väyrynen’s argument shows 
that “lewd” is not semantically evaluative, the parallel argument shows that “good” is 
not semantically evaluative either.16 
 The reason we are not supposed to think of the “good” here as the specifically 
morally good is that it can be held that the notion of moral goodness is anyway 
properly classed as thick – that the qualifying “moral” introduces such an element of 
specificity or of description that we are dealing with something thick. 
When considering the possibility of an antimoralist, I find it natural to say that 
there are two kinds of evaluation associated with “good”. It is semantically 
evaluative, and in addition, someone who cheerfully uses the word thereby conveys 
that she approves of the associated way of valuing. The antimoralist’s aversion to 
using 1*a-1*d is due to the latter aspect. But this does not negate the fact that “good” 
also is evaluative as a matter of content. As noted, Väyrynen appeals to simplicity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Roberts (forthcoming) also uses the antimoralist to cast doubt on Väyrynen’s argument from 
projection behavior. 
	   20	  
considerations against the view that there are different kinds of evaluation associated 
with thick concepts. But if we anyway have to say that there are different kinds of 
evaluation associated with “good”, it seems only reasonable to say the same thing in 
the case of thick concepts.  
It may be tempting to respond to the case of the antimoralist by saying that 
such a character would be conceptually confused in a way that the ‘lewd’-objector is 
not. Where the ‘lewd’-objector acts appropriately, given her evaluative outlook, the 
antimoralist ought not to refuse to use ‘good’ so much as to give voice to her view by 
saying that something is good iff it is supergood – and the rest of us are mistaken 
insofar as we don’t realize this.  I grant that it is intuitive to treat the cases differently 
in this way. But one would want to see the argument for so proceeding. 
In the metaethics literature, much has been made of the possibility of the 
amoralist: someone who makes moral judgments but purportedly is not motivated by 
them – fails to have the attitudes otherwise characteristically associated with such 
judgments.17 The amoralist can be, and has been, appealed to in debates about what it 
is for judgments or expressions to be evaluative. (And it is then relevant to go beyond 
focus on the specifically moral and consider if for all notions of goodness or badness 
however general one can imagine someone who makes judgments involving this 
notion of goodness or badness but remains unmoved.) If semantic evaluativeness 
requires the truth of some motivational internalist thesis, then appeal to an amoralist 
can refute particular semantic evaluativeness claims. Appeal to the antimoralist is in 
the same spirit, but speaks primarily to the use of projection data. 
 
5. Conclusion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See Brink (1989). 
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As indicated by my remarks early on, I have a very high opinion of Väyrynen’s book. 
It is certain to carry the discussion of thick concepts forward in many ways. But I 
have here focused on criticism. An overarching theme of the criticism has been to 
broaden the perspective from Väyrynen’s book: for example to ask questions about 
the thick that he is not asking, to problematize the notion of evaluativeness, and to 
consider whether what he says carries over to the paradigmatically thin. 
 
Matti Eklund 
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